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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, A. D. 1947.

No. 755

JOHN FRANCIS CLEMENTS, an Infant,
By JESSE FRANKLIN CLEMENTS,
His Next Friend,

Petitioner,


vs.

CLEVELAND & CHICAGO MOTOR EXPRESS
COMPANY, a corporation,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF.

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Chicago, Illinois,
Attorney for Petitioner.



INDEX.

	PAGE
Improper Selection of Jurors.....	2
Basis of Jurisdiction	5
Reasons for Allowance of Writ.....	6
Petition	6
Petitioner Was Denied a Constitutional Jury.....	9
Petitioner Has Not Waived His Objections to the Panel of Jurors	16
An Infant Cannot Waive His Constitutional Rights..	17
Prejudice to the Petitioner Need Not Be Shown.....	21
Prayer	21

AUTHORITIES CITED. ---

	PAGE
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U. S. 389, 393.....	18
Ballard v. United States, U. S., 91 Law Ed. 195	15
Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 69, 86 Law Ed. 680, 707-708	14,16
Harris v. Young, 298 Ill. 319.....	19
Hodges v. Easton, 106 U. S. 408, 412.....	18
Keenan v. Flanagan, 50 R. I. 321, 147 Atl. 617.....	20
Kingsbury v. Buckner, 134 U. S. 650, 680.....	20
Kroot v. Liberty Bank of Chicago, 307 Ill. App. 209	20
Leonard v. Chicago Title & Tr. Co., 287 Ill. App. 397	20
McReynolds v. Miller, 372 Ill. 151, 153.....	19
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U. S. 292, 307.....	18
People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 249 N. Y. 314, 164 N. E. 111, 61 A.L.R. 793.....	17
Rausch v. Cozian, 86 Colo. 389, 282 P. 251.....	20
Stevens v. Wood, 196 Iowa 1394, 195 N. W. 239.....	20
Suter Bros. v. Hebert, 133 Kan. 262, 299 Pac. 627....	20
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217, 90 L. Ed. 1181	11,21
United Workmen, et al. v. Zuhlke, 129 Ill. 298.....	20

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**PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
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FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.**

*To the Honorable the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:*

The petitioner, John Francis Clements, an infant, by
Jesse Franklin Clements, his next friend, respectfully
shows:

I.

Improper selection of jurors.

The petitioner (plaintiff in the trial court) brought an action against the respondent (defendant in the trial court) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, for damages resulting from personal injuries.

It was alleged that the petitioner, John Francis Clements, a child six years of age, was crossing a street intersection in a closely built up residence neighborhood having the green light in his favor. The driver of respondent's truck crossed the intersection at a high rate of speed and failed to observe the statutory regulations requiring the slackening of speed at street intersections and the exercise of due care upon observing small children in the highway. The child suffered extreme injuries, but the jury found respondent not guilty.

As one of the grounds for a new trial, petitioner contended that he was not given a constitutional jury; it was not a cross-section of the community, but was picked by the jury commissioners, having attributes and qualifications vastly different from a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community—jurors whose inclinations, sentiments and feelings would not be sympathetic with the petitioner's claim.

It appears from an examination of the records that an unduly high percentage of persons of certain vocations were selected to the exclusion of others; also that the educational qualifications of the jurors were much higher than those of jurors taken from a cross-section of the community.

For the purpose of determining what would be a fair cross-section of the community, Petitioner refers to Volume 2 of Characteristics of Population for the Chicago Metropolitan District of the 16th Census of the United States, 1940. On page 9 will be found classifications of the various occupations included in each major occupation group. There are 12 separate classifications, including professional workers, semi-professional workers, farmers and farm managers, proprietors, managers and officials, clerical sales and kindred workers, craftsmen and foremen, operatives and kindred workers, domestic service workers, farm laborers, farm laborers (unpaid family workers), and laborers (except farm).

According to this report, of the total population in the Chicago Metropolitan District there were the following percentages engaged in the various classifications:

Professional workers	6.8%
Farmers and farm managers.....	.2%
Proprietors, managers and officials (except farm)	8.7%
Clerical sales and kindred workers.....	26.3%
Craftsmen	14.5%
Operatives	21 %
Domestic service workers	3.1%
Service workers (except domestic).....	10.2%
Farm laborers and foremen.....	.2%
Farm laborers (unpaid)1%
Laborers (except farm)	7.1%

It appears from the affidavits filed in support of petitioner's motion for new trial that 15% of the persons whose names were in the jury box for each of the months of January, February and March, 1947, were proprietors, managers and officials, and that 7% of such persons were housewives unemployed but whose husbands were proprietors, managers and officials; whereas it appears from

the 1940 United States Census that 8.7% of the population in the Chicago Metropolitan District were classified as proprietors, managers and officials (Rec. 141).

There were drawn for the panel almost twice as many persons as there should have been who were proprietors of businesses or had managerial positions.

Although it appears from the Census of 1940 that there were in this area 7.1% engaged as laborers, they were excluded from the panel.

It appears further from the Census of 1940 that 38% of the population attended grade school, 15% attended high school, and 5½% attended college (page 655).

According to the tabulations made by the Clerk of Court from his records, 23.5% attended grade school, 48% attended high school (Rec. 126) and 26.5% attended college (Rec. 127). It thus appears that in the panels were more than three times as many persons having attended college as would be found in a true cross-section of the community, and there were 29% more persons having attended high school than there would have been had the jury been drawn from a true cross-section of the community.

It further appeared that during the three months period under examination 8 out of 319 jurors drawn were employees of the Illinois Bell Telephone Company (Rec. 142). The jury commissioners had on hand more than 100 questionnaires of employees of the Illinois Bell Telephone Company held in reserve (Rec. 107). The Clerk of Court testified that, in addition to the regular pay received by all jurors, the employees of the Illinois Bell Telephone Company were paid their salaries by their employer (Rec. 113).

Experience has shown that jurors of this type are not fair to personal injury claimants.

Upon his motion for a new trial petitioner claimed that he was deprived of a fair trial because he was not provided with a jury of proper qualifications.

An appeal was taken by respondent to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. That court affirmed the judgment without opinion.

This petition is filed to induce the Supreme Court of the United States to reverse the judgment of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals.

II.

Basis of Jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked to correct an error in failing to provide a jury in accordance with the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

The decision was rendered by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals without opinion on January 22, 1948 and is not reported.

The right to trial by an impartial jury means that prospective jurors must be selected by court officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any group, or the intentional inclusion of particular groups or classes. It is the duty of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the exercise of its power of supervision of the administration of justice in the federal courts, to reverse a judgment where it appears that by reason of the method adopted by the jury commissioners in selecting jurors certain classes were selected and other classes excluded,

so that the jury was not comprised of persons representative of a true cross-section of the community.

In these circumstances the question is: May the jury commissioners consciously select for jury panels persons who are either proprietors of business or hold managerial positions with such proprietors, to the exclusion of persons engaged as laborers and persons whose educational qualifications are higher than are representative of a true cross-section of the community?

III.

Reasons for allowance of writ.

The Circuit Court of Appeals has decided an important question of federal law which has not been but should be settled by this Court. Its decision on that question is probably in conflict with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. It is submitted that these reasons call for the exercise of this Court's power of review.

IV.

Petition.

Wherefore petitioner respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari be issued out of and under the seal of this Court commanding the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to certify and send to this Court, for its review and determination, on a day certain named therein, a complete transcript of the record in the case numbered and entitled on its docket as No. 9465, John Francis Clements, by Jesse Franklin, Clements, his next friend, v. Cleveland & Chicago Motor Express Company; that the judgment of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

be reversed by this Court; and that the petitioner may have such other and further relief as it deems just.

Respectfully submitted,

John Francis Clements, an infant,
by Jesse Franklin Clements, his
next friend, Petitioner

By ROYAL W. IRWIN,
Attorney for Petitioner.

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Chicago, Illinois.

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vs.

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 COMPANY, a corporation,
 Respondent.

**BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF
 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
 CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR
 THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.**

Petitioner Was Denied a Constitutional Jury.

The law requires that a jury shall be representative of all classes; that neither the rich nor the poor, the educated nor the unintelligent, shall have any advantage. Our system of justice contemplates a jury representative of all classes and all strata of society. It is improper for the jury commissioner to consciously select jurors a higher percentage of whom are engaged in certain

vocations or are more highly educated than would be representative of a cross-section of the community.

For the purpose of determining what would be a fair cross-section of the community, petitioner refers to Volume 2 of the 1940 United States Census for the Metropolitan District of Chicago.

It appears from the record that 15% of the persons selected by the jury commissioners were proprietors, managers and officials; in addition thereto were 7% who were housewives not engaged in any business but whose husbands were proprietors, managers and officials; whereas, as appears from the census, only 8.7% of the population were classified as proprietors, managers and officials (Rec. 141).

There were drawn almost twice as many persons who were proprietors or had managerial positions as there should have been.

Although it appears from the census that there were in this area 7.1% engaged, as laborers, there were substantially no laborers to be found in the panel.

The jury commissioners selected more than three times as many persons having attended college as would be found in a true cross-section of the community, and they chose 29% more persons having attended high school than there would have been had the jury been drawn from a true cross-section of the community.

The clerk of court, who acts as a jury commissioner, testified as to the manner in which jurors were selected. It appeared from his testimony that the jurors selected were consciously chosen by the jury commissioners having in mind the information as to their vocations and educations as shown by their questionnaires (Rec. 106). Inasmuch as the same disproportions occurred in three

separate months, it is apparent that the jury commissioners intended the results which they obtained. The fact that the jury commissioners may have felt that the interests of society might best be served by selecting jurors of certain educational qualifications or social status does not excuse them for failure to follow the law.

It is difficult to explain the motive of the jury commissioners in selecting an undue proportion of employees of the Illinois Bell Telephone Company. Out of 319 drawn over the three months period, 8 of the jurors were employees of that company (Rec. 142). The jury commissioners had on hand more than 100 questionnaires of employees of the Illinois Bell Telephone Company (Rec. 107) kept in reserve. The only explanation the jury commissioner had to offer was that, in addition to the regular fee which all jurors received, these employees were paid their salaries during the time they were in jury service, and thereby received double pay for their time (Rec. 113).

The pay which these jurors received for their time was different than the pay received by other jurors. Such a practice seems extremely undemocratic. We are required to perform jury service as a civic function. It is not to be expected that citizens are to engage in the function of jury service on a business basis or for profit. It is un-American and contrary to our traditions to permit certain jurors to receive pay in addition to the regular fee paid to all other jurors. The situation is fraught with danger if jurors are permitted to receive extra money for their services from outside sources.

The Supreme Court of the United States has recently decided a case which is much in point. In the case of *Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.*, 328 U. S. 217, 90 L. Ed. 1181, it appears that in California a jury was selected

where there was a conscious endeavor to avoid laboring men. The Court said at page 924:

"The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. *Smith v. Texas*, 311 U. S. 128, 130, 85 L. Ed. 84, 86, 61 S. Ct. 164; *Glasser v. United States*, 315 U. S. 60, 85, 86 L. Ed. 680, 707, 62 S. Ct. 457. This does not mean, of course, that every jury must contain representatives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical groups of the community; frequently such complete representation would be impossible. But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these groups. Recognition must be given to the fact that those eligible for jury service are to be found in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or class matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to open the door to class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury. * * *

"The undisputed evidence in this case demonstrates a failure to abide by the proper rules and principles of jury selection. Both the clerk of the court and the jury commissioner testified that they deliberately and intentionally excluded from the jury lists all persons who work for a daily wage. * * *

"It was further admitted that business men and their wives constituted at least 50% of the jury lists, although both the clerk and the commissioner denied that they consciously chose according to wealth or occupation. Thus the admitted discrimination was limited to those who worked for a daily wage, many of whom might suffer financial loss by serving on juries at the rate of \$4 a day and would be excused for that reason.

"This exclusion of all those who earn a daily wage cannot be justified by federal or state law. Certainly nothing in the federal statutes warrants such an exclusion. . . .

"Moreover, the general principles underlying proper jury selection clearly outlaw the exclusion practiced in this instance. Jury competence is not limited to those who earn their livelihood on other than a daily basis. One who is paid \$3 a day may be as fully competent as one who is paid \$30 a week or \$300 a month. In other words, the pay period of a particular individual is completely irrelevant to his eligibility and capacity to serve as a juror. Wage earners, including those who are paid by the day, constitute a very substantial portion of the community, a portion that cannot be intentionally and systematically excluded in whole or in part without doing violence to the democratic nature of the jury system. Were we to sanction an exclusion of this nature we would encourage whatever desires those responsible for the selection of jury panels may have to discriminate against persons of low economic and social status. We would breathe life into any latent tendencies to establish the jury as the instrument of the economically and socially privileged. That we refuse to do."

The clerk of court testified that to obtain lists of names of prospective jurors he mailed a form letter to civic and religious organizations, clubs, parent-teachers' organizations, business men's organizations, churches, women's clubs, social clubs, including Austin Women's Club, Hyde Park Women's Club, Federation of Women's Clubs, League of Women Voters, Lions, Kiwanis, American Legion and Auxiliaries (Rec. 103). To those on the lists obtained from these organizations he mailed a questionnaire (Rec. 104). We do not believe that the names of prospective jurors should be obtained in that manner. As will be seen from the names the names of the organi-

zations mentioned, they are not truly representative of the people. Bias and prejudice is bound to result.

A few years ago a jury was challenged because of the fact that the women were selected from the Illinois League of Women Voters.

In the case of *Glasser v. United States*, 315 U. S. 59, 86 Law. Ed. 680, 707-708, the Court said:

"For the mechanics of trial by jury we revert to the common law as it existed in this country and in England when the Constitution was adopted. *Patton v. United States*, 281 U. S. 276, 74 L. ed. 854, 50 S. Ct. 253, 70 A.L.R. 263. But even as jury trial, which was a privilege at common law, has become a right with us, so also, whatever limitations were inherent in the historical common law concept of the jury as a body of one's peers do not prevail in this country. Our notions of what a proper jury is have developed in harmony with our basis concepts of a democratic society and a representative government. For 'It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community.' *Smith v. Texas*, 311 U. S. 128, 130, 85 L. ed. 84, 86, 61 S. Ct. 164.

"Jurors in a federal court are to have the qualifications of those in the highest court of the State, and they are to be selected by the clerk of the court and a jury commissioner. Judicial Code, secs. 275, 276; 28 U.S.C.A. Secs. 411, 412. This duty of selection may not be delegated. *United States v. Murphy* (D. C.), 224 F. 554; *Re Special Grand Jury* (D. C.), 50 F. (2d) 973. And, its exercise must always accord with the fact that the proper functioning of the jury system, and, indeed, our democracy itself, requires that the jury be a 'body truly representative of the community,' and not the organ of any special group or class. *If that requirement is observed, the officials charged with choosing federal jurors may exercise some discretion to the end that*

competent jurors may be called. But they must not allow the desire for competent jurors to lead them into selections which do not comport with the concept of the jury as a cross-section of the community. Tendencies, no matter how slight, toward the selection of jurors by any method other than a process which will insure a trial by a representative group are undermining processes weakening the institution of jury trial, and should be sturdily resisted. That the motives influencing such tendencies may be of the best must not blind us to the dangers of allowing any encroachment whatsoever on this essential right. Steps innocently taken may one by one lead to the irretrievable impairment of substantial liberties.

"The deliberate selection of jurors from the membership of particular private organizations definitely does not conform to the traditional requirements of jury trial. No matter how high principled and imbued with a desire to inculcate public virtue such organizations may be, the dangers inherent in such method of selection are the more real when the members of those organizations from training or otherwise acquire a bias in favor of the prosecution. The jury selected from the membership of such an organization is then not only the organ of a special class, but, in addition, it is also openly partisan. If such practices are to be countenanced, the hard won right of trial by jury becomes a thing of doubtful value, lacking one of the essential characteristics that have made it a cherished feature of our institutions." (Emphasis ours.)

In the case of *Ballard v. United States*, 91 Law Ed. Adv. of 195 91 Law Ed. 195, it was held reversible error to exclude women from grand petit jury panels. The Court said (page 199):

"The point illustrates that the exclusion of women from jury panels may at times be highly prejudicial to the defendants. But reversible error does not de-

pend on a showing of prejudice in an individual case. The evil lies in the admitted exclusion of an eligible class or group in the community in disregard of the prescribed standards of jury selection. The systematic and intentional exclusion of women, like the exclusion of a racial group, *Smith v. Texas*, 311 U.S. 138, 85 L. ed. 84, 61 S. Ct. 164, or an economic or social class, *Thiel v. Southern P. Co.*, 328 U.S. 217, 90 L. ed. 1181, 66 S. Ct. 984, *supra*, deprives the jury system of the broad base it was designated by Congress to have in our democratic society. It is a departure from the statutory scheme. As well stated in *United States v. Roemig* (D. C. Iowa), 52 F. Supp. 857, 862, 'Such action is operative to destroy the basic democracy and classlessness of jury personnel.' It does not accord to the defendant the type of jury to which the law entitles him. It is an administrative denial of a right which the lawmakers have not seen fit to withhold from, but have actually guaranteed to him.' Cf. *Kotteakos v. United States*, 328 U. S. 750, 90 L. ed. 1557, 66 S. Ct. 1239. The injury is not limited to the defendant—there is injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts."

Petitioner Has Not Waived His Objections to the Panel of Jurors.

Counsel for respondent will probably urge that petitioner has waived his right to object to the jury.

It is true that in most cases where the question has been raised it was done by motion to quash the *venire*, but in a rather recent case considered by the United States Supreme Court the question was raised by a motion for new trial and no criticism was made of that practice.

In *Glasser v. United States*, 315 U. S. 86, after the trial of the case, and on a motion for new trial, it was urged for the first time that the petit jury was improperly

drawn. An appeal was allowed to the United States Supreme Court. The following appears in the opinion (page 419):

"All the petitioners contend that they were denied an impartial trial because of the alleged exclusion from the petit jury panel of all women not members of the Illinois League of Women Voters. *In support of their motions for a new trial Glasser and Roth* filed affidavits which are the basis of petitioners' presents contentions. Kretske did not file an affidavit, but urges the point here.

"Glasser swore on information and belief * * * that women not members of the League, but otherwise qualified, were systematically excluded, by reason of which affiant 'did not have a trial by a jury free from bias, prejudice, and prior instructions, and as a result thereof the jury was disqualified and this affiant's rights were prejudiced in that he was deprived of a trial by jury guaranteed to him by the laws and the Constitution of the United States of America, and particularly the Fifth and Sixth Amendment, all of which he offers to prove.' * * * *The court overruled the motion for a new trial.*" (Emphasis ours.)

The opinion of the Court clearly indicates that it was proper to raise the question of an unconstitutional jury by way of motion for new trial.

An Infant Cannot Waive His Constitutional Rights.

The petitioner, at the time of the trial, was an infant six years of age, and was incapable of waiving any of his constitutional rights.

Nor was it within petitioner's power to waive that right and accept any other jury.

In *People ex rel. Battista v. Christian*, 249 N. Y. 314, 164 N. E. 111., 61 A.L.R. 793, the Court of Appeals of New York held that where fundamental rights and public

policy were involved, such rights and policy transcended individual desires and could not be waived by the individual concerned. The Court said:

“Many judicial opinions can be found in which declarations are made that constitutional rights and privileges may be waived. Most of these expressions occur in civil actions. (Cases cited.) From this mass of opinions and decisions, the rule can be deduced that waiver is not permitted where a question of jurisdiction or fundamental rights is involved and public injury would result. A privilege, merely personal, may be waived; a public fundamental right, the exercise of which is requisite to jurisdiction to try, condemn and punish, is binding upon the individual, and cannot be disregarded by him. *The public policy of the State as expressed in the Constitution takes precedence over his personal wish or convenience* * * *” (Italics supplied.)

Clearly, the Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution confers not a privilege but a right and is a mandate to the courts created under the Constitution to enforce that right—to make available to litigants a “constitutional jury”.

One learned writer says:

“But it seems to us that an agreement to waive a legal privilege which the law gives as a matter of State policy cannot be binding upon a party, unless the law itself provides for the waiver.” (Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, Eighth Ed., page 598.)

Moreover, the courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of basic constitutional rights and do not presume acquiescence in the loss of such rights. (See *Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy*, 301 U. S. 389; 393; *Hodges v. Easton*, 106 U. S. 408, 412, and *Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission*, 301 U. S. 292, 307.

Except in a very few States, because the law jealously guards the rights of infants and because they are wards of the court and are not to be prejudiced by any act or default of their next friend or guardian, and for the reason that the court is bound to protect their interests notwithstanding the failure of their representatives to do so, the rule is that the court itself will protect their interests, although objection or exception or other technical maneuver was not taken in apt time.

In *McReynolds v. Miller*, 372 Ill. 151, 153, the Supreme Court of Illinois said:

“ * * * When the property rights of an infant are in litigation and the infant is in court, he at once becomes the ward of the court, whose duty it is to see that his rights are properly protected. The law contemplates a defense, in fact, so far as is necessary to protect the interests of the ward. *The Court is bound to specially guard the interests of minors, and to notice legitimate and substantial objections whether raised by the guardian or not.* * * *.” (Italics supplied.)

Literally hundreds of cases hold that a minor's rights are not waived by his failure to conform to the tribunal requirements of procedure.

Nor can an infant's guardian or next friend waive or admit away any of the substantial rights of the minor.

In *Harris v. Young*, 298 Ill. 319, the guardian *ad litem* entered into a written stipulation as to certain facts. These facts were supplied to the attorneys by one who would have been an incompetent witness at the trial. After stating the duty of courts to protect minors, the Court said, page 331:

“ * * * We hold this stipulation is incompetent against the minor and that it was error to permit it to be admitted against her, although the stipulation was signed by the guardian *ad litem*. ”

For other cases holding that substantial rights of a minor may not be waived by his next friend, guardian or attorney, see:

Kroot v. Liberty Bank of Chicago, 307 Ill. App. 209.

Leonard v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 287 Ill. App. 397.

Stevens v. Wood, 196 Iowa 1394, 195 N. W. 239.

Rausch v. Cozian, 86 Colo. 389, 282 P. 251.

Suter Bros. v. Hebert, 133 Kan. 262, 299 Pac. 627.

Keenan v. Flanagan, 50 R. I. 321, 147 Atl. 617.

A question that might very naturally arise in the mind of the Court is, what authority does a next friend, guardian or attorney have to bind an infant? The rule, as stated in *Kingsbury v. Buckner*, 134 U. S. 650, 680, is:

“ * * * It is undoubtedly the rule in Illinois, as elsewhere, that a next friend or guardian *ad litem* cannot, by admissions or stipulations, surrender the rights of the infant. The court, whose duty it is to protect the interests of the infant, should see to it that they are not bargained away by those assuming, or appointed, to represent him. But this rule does not prevent a guardian *ad litem* or *pro-chien amy* from assenting to such arrangements as will facilitate the determination of the case in which the rights of the infant are involved * * * ” (such as agreeing that the case could be heard in a different division of the court when such agreement would result in a more speedy determination of the cause).

In *United Workmen et al. v. Zuhlke*, 129 Ill. 298, the Court said (page 307):

“It thus appears that the judgment of expulsion rests upon the appearance of the accused (before a lodge committee), and upon his admissions of facts. Appearance and admissions involve the element of consent. If a man is brought into court,

not by service of process, but by an entry of his appearance, he must be intelligent enough to comprehend the meaning of his act. If he admits a fact to be true, such admission cannot bind him, unless he has mental capacity enough to understand its force and effect."

Prejudice to the Petitioner Need Not Be Shown.

The argument that prejudice to petitioner must be shown is completely answered by the Supreme Court in *Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.*, 328 U. S. 217, where, at page 225, it is said:

" * * * On that basis it becomes unnecessary to determine whether the petitioner was in any way prejudiced by the wrongful exclusion or whether he was one of the excluded class. (Cases cited.) It is likewise immaterial that the jury which actually decided the factual issue in the case was found to contain at least five members of the laboring class. The evil lies in the admitted wholesale exclusion of a large class of wage earners in disregard of the high standards of jury selection. To reassert those standards, to guard against the subtle undermining of the jury system, requires a new trial by a jury drawn from a panel properly and fairly chosen."

PRAYER.

It is urged that this Petition for Certiorari be granted to permit a full consideration of the matters involved, to the end that the judgment of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

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Attorney for Petitioner.

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FILE COPY

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, A. D. 1937

No. 755

JOHN FRANCIS CLEMENTE, et al.,
By JAMES FRANKLIN CLEMENTE,
His Next Friend,

Petitioner.

vs.


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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

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INDEX.

	PAGE
List of Authorities Cited.....	ii
Statement of Facts.....	1
Argument	3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.

I.

Plaintiff did not make any motion for a directed verdict or any objection to the jury. The only ruling of the trial Court claimed to be erroneous is the denial of the motion for new trial. This is not assignable as error, and the record, therefore, presents no question for review.....	3
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II.

Plaintiff accepted the jury and thereby waived any objection to the panel.....	3
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III.

The selection of the jury is a matter of procedure rather than of substance. Plaintiff, though a minor, is, therefore, bound by the act of his counsel in accepting the jury.....	4
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IV.

The jury panel, from which the jurors were drawn, was properly selected by the jury commissioners in accordance with the statutes. There was no deliberate or intentional exclusion of the members of any group, class, race or creed, and the panel actually did represent a true cross-section of the members of the community qualified for jury service under the law. Persons qualified for jury service under the statute naturally have a higher educational background and employment status than the population as a whole. No impropriety in the selection of the panel was shown.....

5

AUTHORITIES CITED.

Agnew v. U. S., 165 U. S. 36, 44; 41 L. Ed. 624, 627	4
Ballard v. U. S., 329 U. S. 187; 91 L. Ed. 181.....	9
Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 275; 91 L. Ed. 2043, 2053	7
Fishburn v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 137 U. S. 60; 34 L. Ed. 585	3
Glasser v. U. S., 315 U. S. 59; 86 L. Ed. 68.....	9
Kingsbury v. Buckner, 134 U. S. 650, 680; 33 L. Ed. 1047, 1059	4
Miller v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 301 Ill. App. 386, 389....	5
Moore, Albert N., Matter of, 209 U. S. 490, 496; 52 L. Ed. 904, 907.....	4
Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 132 U. S. 191; 33 L. Ed. 309.....	3

iii

O'Malley v. Marquardt, 170 Ill. App. 278, 282.....	5
Powers v. U. S., 223 U. S. 303, 312; 56 L. Ed. 448, 452	4
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217; 90 L. Ed. 1181	9
VanStone v. Stillwell & Bierce Mfg. Co., 142 U. S. 128, 134; 35 L. Ed. 961, 963.....	3
Veer v. Hagemann, 334 Ill. 23, 29.....	4

Statutes.

Title 28, Sec. 441, et seq., U.S.C.A.....	5
Secs. 2 and 4, Ch. 78, Ill. Rev. Stats.....	6

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to a general discussion of the problem of the existence of solutions of the system of equations (1) for arbitrary values of the parameters α and β . It is shown that the system has solutions for all values of the parameters α and β if the function $f(x)$ is continuous and has a bounded derivative.

2. In the second part of the paper the problem of the uniqueness of the solutions of the system (1) is considered. It is shown that the system has a unique solution for all values of the parameters α and β if the function $f(x)$ is continuous and has a bounded derivative.

3. In the third part of the paper the problem of the stability of the solutions of the system (1) is considered. It is shown that the system has stable solutions for all values of the parameters α and β if the function $f(x)$ is continuous and has a bounded derivative.

4. In the fourth part of the paper the problem of the asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the system (1) is considered. It is shown that the solutions of the system (1) tend to zero as $x \rightarrow \infty$ for all values of the parameters α and β if the function $f(x)$ is continuous and has a bounded derivative.

5. In the fifth part of the paper the problem of the periodicity of the solutions of the system (1) is considered. It is shown that the system has periodic solutions for all values of the parameters α and β if the function $f(x)$ is continuous and has a bounded derivative.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, A. D. 1947.

No. 755

JOHN FRANCIS CLEMENTS, an Infant,
By **JESSE FRANKLIN CLEMENTS**,
His Next Friend,
Petitioner,

vs.

**CLEVELAND & CHICAGO MOTOR EXPRESS
COMPANY**, a corporation,
Respondent.

**BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI.**

STATEMENT.

This was a personal injury action. After a full trial in the District Court, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. A motion for new trial was denied, and judgment was duly entered on the verdict by the trial court (Trans. 137). On appeal by the petitioner (plaintiff), this judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Petitioner now requests this court for a further review by this petition for certiorari.

The only contention made by the petitioner, is that the jury panel from which this jury was drawn, was improperly selected. The only grounds upon which this contention is based, is that the proportion of persons having a high school education or better among the 570 persons in the jury panel from which the jury was drawn, was greater than for the Chicago Metropolitan District as a whole, as shown by the 1940 census, and also, that the jury panel contained a greater proportion of proprietors, managers and professional people, than existed in the population of the Chicago Metropolitan District as a whole as shown by the same census (Trans. 101, et seq., 114, 121, 141).

There is no evidence that there was any deliberate or intentional exclusion of any class or group from the jury panel by the jury commissioners. On the contrary, there is direct evidence that the jury commissioners intended and made every effort to select names for the jury panel which would constitute a fair cross-section of the persons qualified for jury service in the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois (Trans. 110).

The record shows that petitioner's attorney, after examining this particular jury on the *voir dire*, and excusing some of them, stated to the court, "I will accept the jury." (Trans. 7, 40). The trial then proceeded to its conclusion. After a verdict in favor of the defendant, petitioner filed a motion for new trial in which petitioner for the first time contended that the jury panel had been improperly selected (Trans. 39).

ARGUMENT.

I.

The Record Presents No Question for Review.

Petitioner did not object to the composition of the jury and made no motion to strike the panel until after the verdict had been returned, when that objection was raised for the first and only time in the motion for new trial. Thus, the only ruling of the Trial Court claimed to be erroneous is the denial of the motion for new trial. It is settled law that the overruling of a motion for a new trial is not assignable as error, and does not furnish any ground for appeal.

Fishburn v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 137 U. S. 60,
34 L. Ed. 585

Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 132 U. S.
191, 33 L. Ed. 309

Van Stone v. Stillwell & Bierce Mfg. Co., 142
U. S. 128, 134; 35 L. Ed. 961, 963

II.

Petitioner Waived Any Objection to the Panel of Jurors.

After examining the prospective jurors on the *voir dire* (Trans. 7, et seq.) counsel for petitioner stated in open court, "I will accept the jury." (Trans. 40) Thereafter, the trial proceeded to its conclusion resulting in a verdict and judgment for the defendant, before any objection to the composition of the jury was made. An objection to the *venire* must be made at the first opportunity, and before the case is submitted to the jury. When counsel for petitioner (plaintiff) accepted the jury, he waived any objection thereto.

Agnew v. U. S., 165 U. S. 36, 44; 41 L. Ed. 624, 627

Powers v. U. S., 223 U. S. 303, 312, 56 L. Ed. 448, 452

Veer v. Hagemann, 334 Ill. 23, 29

III.

Plaintiff, Though a Minor, Is Bound By the Act of His Counsel in Accepting the Jury.

It was contended below that while the principles just stated would apply in an ordinary case, they do not apply in this case because plaintiff is a minor, represented by his next friend. It is true, that a guardian *ad litem* or next friend has no power or authority to waive the substantial rights of a minor. However, it is well settled that he may bind the minor with respect to matters of procedure, and is authorized to make appropriate arrangements for handling and facilitating the trial.

In *Kingsbury v. Buckner*, 134 U. S. 650, 680, 33 L. Ed. 1047, 1059, it was held that the next friend, or guardian *ad litem* of a minor had authority to stipulate for the hearing of a cause by a different division of the Supreme Court of Illinois than that to which it was assigned by law.

In *the Matter of Albert N. Moore*, 209 U. S. 490, 496, 52 L. Ed. 904, 907, it was held that the next friend of a minor had authority to waive the minor's rights to have a cause remanded from the federal to a state court. The Supreme Court said:

"That a next friend may select the tribunal in which the suit shall be brought is clear. While he may do nothing prejudicial to the substantial rights of the minor, yet the mere selection of one out of many tribunals having jurisdiction cannot be considered as an act to the latter's prejudice."

In *O'Malley v. Marquardt*, 170 Ill. App. 278, 282, it was held that plaintiff's next friend had authority to waive a jury on his behalf and in *Miller v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co.*, 301 Ill. App. 386, 389, a minor was held to be bound by the acquiescence of his next friend in a ruling directing a verdict in favor of certain defendants, and his failure to appeal therefrom.

The case at bar falls squarely within the rule announced in the above cases. Plaintiff's counsel accepted the jury, and plaintiff is bound by his act in so doing. At the time he accepted the jury, plaintiff's counsel believed this particular jury to be a fair and proper tribunal for the trial of this cause. All of the facts were available to him at that time. The selection of the jury related to a matter of procedure, not of substance, and its acceptance by plaintiff's counsel was binding on the plaintiff.

IV.

The Jury Panel Was Properly Selected.

The duties of the jury commissioners are specified in Title 28, Section 411, et seq. U.S.C.A. Section 411 provides that jurors to serve in the courts of the United States shall have the same qualifications, and be entitled to the same exemptions, as jurors of the highest courts of law in such state. Section 412 authorizes and directs the jury commissioners to select and place names of qualified jurors in the jury box without reference to party affiliations, the box to contain the names of not less than 300 persons, and provides that all grand and petit jurors shall be returned from such parts of the district as the court shall direct so as to be most favorable to an impartial trial, and not to incur unnecessary expense, or unduly burden the citizens of any part of the district to perform such service. Section 415 provides that no

citizen shall be disqualified for jury service on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude.

Under these circumstances, it was the duty of the jury commissioner to obtain the names of qualified jurors from various parts of the district and place the same in the jury box. The statute leaves the mechanics of this operation to their discretion. There is not the slightest suggestion that any class or group of the population were deliberately or intentionally excluded from jury service. On the contrary, Mr. Johnson's testimony is that the commissioners attempted and intended to secure a cross-section of the inhabitants of the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois (Trans. 109) and the tabulations in evidence show that the commissioners actually did secure such a cross-section and that no substantial class or group was not represented in the jury box.

The fact that there was a higher percentage of college graduates and a lower percentage of laborers in the jury panel, than is shown by the census for the Chicago Metropolitan District, simply demonstrates that the jury commissioners did their work properly and well. The qualifications for jurors in the State of Illinois are established by Sections 2 and 4 of Chapter 78, Ill. Rev. Stats. Section 2 provides that persons to be qualified as jurors must be between the ages of 21 and 65, in the possession of their natural faculties and not infirm or decrepit, of fair character, approved integrity, sound judgment, well informed and who understand the English language. Section 4 exempts the various public officials and others therein specified including attorneys, ministers of gospel, school teachers, newspaper employees, etc. from jury service. The net effect of these statutes is to disqualify many people for jury service in Illinois in accordance with the express statutory policy of requiring a certain

minimum standard of intelligence, integrity and educational qualifications for jury service. The application of these statutes would necessarily result in a smaller percentage of laborers and poorly educated people, and a higher percentage of well educated persons with responsible positions in the jury box than in the population as a whole. In fact, if the qualifications of those whose names were in the jury box had been, percentagewise, exactly the same as the 1940 census for the Chicago Metropolitan District, it would suggest that the jury commissioners had not performed their duties properly, rather than that they had performed them well.

Furthermore, the Chicago Metropolitan District, as that term is used in the census, consists of the City of Chicago, and parts of Lake, Will and DuPage counties, Illinois, and Lake County, Indiana (Census, p. 203). The Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois, on the other hand, includes ten counties of Illinois, namely, Cook, DeKalb, DuPage, Grundy, Lake, LaSalle, McHenry, Kane, Kendall and Will. This trial was held and jury drawn in the year 1946, whereas the census relied on by petitioner relates to the year 1940. The Census, therefore, does not even purport to be representative of the population of the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois at the time this jury panel was drawn.

Substantially the same point as is raised in this case was made and overruled by this court in the case of *Fay v. New York*, 332 U. S. 261, 275; 91 L. Ed. 2043, 2053, in which the validity of a New York special jury was sustained. One of the arguments was that there was a great disparity between the percentage of jurors in each occupation represented on the jury list and the occupational distribution of the number of employed persons in the year 1940 in Manhattan, as shown by the Census. This court said:

“Apart from the discrepancy of five years in the dates of the data and the differences in classification of occupations, the two tables do not afford statistical proof that the jury percentages are the result of discrimination. Such a conclusion would be justified only if we knew whether the application of the proper jury standards would affect all occupations alike, of which there is no evidence and which we regard as improbable. The percentage of persons employed or seeking employment in each occupation does not establish even an approximate ratio for those of each occupation that should appear in a fairly selected jury panel. The former is not limited, as the latter must be, to those over 21 or under 70 years of age. It is common knowledge that many employed and seekers of employment in New York are not, as jurors must be, citizens of the United States. How many could not meet the property qualifications? How many could not read and write the English language understandingly? It is only after effect is given to these admittedly constitutional requirements that we would have any figures which determined or even suggested the effect of the additional disqualifications imposed on special jurors.”

• • •

“It is not unlikely that the requirements of citizenship, property and literacy disqualify a greater proportion of laborers, craftsmen and service employees than of some other classes. Those who are illiterate or, if literate in their own, are unable to speak or write the English language, naturally find employment chiefly in manual work. It is impossible from the defendants' evidence in this case to find that the distribution of the jury panel among occupations is not the result of the application of legitimate standards of disqualification.

“On the other hand, the evidence that there has been no discrimination as to occupation in selection of the panel, while from interested witnesses, whose duty it was to administer the law, is clear and positive and is neither contradicted nor improbable. The testimony of those in charge of the selection, offered

by the defendants themselves, is that without occupational discrimination they applied the standards of the statute to all whom they examined. We are unable to find that this evidence is untrue."

These comments of this court are directly applicable to and are controlling in this case.

In *Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.*, 328 U. S. 217, 90 L. Ed. 1181, and *Ballard v. U. S.*, 329 U. S. 187, 91 L. Ed. 181, the jury commissioners deliberately, systematically and intentionally excluded certain groups or classes of people in the selection of the jury panel. In *Glasser v. U. S.*, 315 U. S. 59, 86 L. Ed. 68, the validity of the jury was sustained on the ground that the burden of showing the impropriety in the selection of the panel was on the person alleging it, and that the burden had not been sustained. By way of dictum, this court there said that the deliberate selection of all the jurors from the membership of a private organization, thereby excluding all non-members from jury service, would be improper.

All of these authorities hold simply that the jury commissioners are not authorized under the statutes to deliberately and systematically exclude some group or class from the jury panel. Nothing like that is shown or even suggested by the evidence here, and these authorities, therefore, are not in point.

. . .

For the reasons given, the petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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